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PROFESSOR SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, PROFESSOR OF LAwttt
Here we are again on this ninth occasion to honor a man
who has contributed his entire life to the advancement and
study of public international law. I met Professor Blaine Sloan
many years ago. Many more years ago than I care to remember,
when I was a student struggling with my dissertation and he
was on the mock committee then and I met him in one of these
American study groups studying international law, so to speak,
in flesh and blood. My first meeting with such a distinguished
figure in my field of interest, of course, I remain friends since
Pat and Blaine were my witnesses when I became a U.S. citi-
zen. So, therefore, to welcome him here gives me very special
meaning, personally for me.
University of Nebraska has this habit of producing, every
century, a great legal mind. In the last century, it was of
course, Learned Hand who went to the other school in Cam-
bridge because Pace didn't exist back then. In the 20th century,
Pace is so lucky to have the other distinguished graduate of Ne-
braska Law School, Blaine Sloan, and indeed we are grateful for
having him here. He was the reason I came here. And then
what he did, he played a trick on me. He left. He retired to the
beautiful paradise mountains of Colorado and left me here to
deal with his absence. So, it's therefore, solely appropriate, re-
venge on my part, to drag him down here and I'm glad to have
him here. You have heard about his career, he's accomplished
in so many areas of scholarship and practice, particularly his
career at the United Nations where he finished as the Deputy
Secretary General for Legal Affairs. Words cannot describe the
feelings we have here at Pace to be honored today with his re-
turn, so with that, it gives me a great, great joy to introduce to
you, Professor Blaine Sloan.
PROFESSOR EMERITUS BLINE SLOAN
I am really overwhelmed. I have often said it is a little like
being at your own funeral. I must mention that Wendy Ken-
nedy, President of the Pace International Law Society, gave
ttt Surya Prakash Sinha is a Professor of International Law at Pace
University School of Law and advisor to the Pace International Law Review and
the Pace International Law Society.
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much effort in arranging my travel, and Mr. John Sarcone,
Managing Editor of the Pace International Law Review who we
have to thank for arranging this lecture and for bringing us
such a distinguished lecturer, I want to express my appreciation
to you and through you to all the students and faculty.
I said while I was here, I did sow a few little seeds of an
International Law Program, but I am amazed at how they have
grown and I am really very proud. Particularly of the student
body and the faculty and the administration for what it has
produced.
I have an ideal introduction which goes something like this
and it is certainly appropriate for Professor Brownie that the
speaker needs no introductions and then I know to sit down and
let him speak. Unfortunately, this evening I have come two
thousand miles from Colorado to make this introduction and so
I am afraid you are stuck with a little more than this ideal.
Professor Brownlie has come even further than I have. He
has come from All Souls College, Oxford England. I am afraid
that to most Americans today, Oxford is simply the place where
our current President did not inhale. That, of course, is not true
for this distinguished audience. We may not accept completely
the folk tale that Oxford was founded by Daniel Fitzgrace, but
we do know that its origin is lost in the midst of the middle ages
and we know that today, it is one of the oldest and most emi-
nent of the world's great educational institution. We also know
that holding a professorship at Oxford is itself a certification of
eminence in the field.
Professor Brownlie is not the only Professor of Public Inter-
national Law at Oxford, but he is the Chichele Professor. And
while I was not certain, I surmised that this chair was named
for Henry Chichele who was Archbishop at the time of Henry IV
and also the founder of All Souls College of which Professor
Brownlie is a Fellow. Henry Chichele was also engaged in
peace settlement although not too successfully. He tried two
impossible tasks. One, was to bring together the Pope's of that
era, and the other was to bring peace between England and
France as an aid of Henry IV. Shakespeare rather slanders
Chichele in his great play of Henry IV, making him not as a
peacemaker but as an advocate of the Lord.
1995]
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Professor Brownlie, has had a nearly 40 year career, as a
barrister, teacher, writer, editor, arbitrator, honoree, has had so
many achievements that it would be impossible for me to enu-
merate them here. Some of them are listed in your program
and that you can read as well as I can. As a barrister, he was
called to the bar, engraved in 1958, appointed Queen's Counsel
in 1979. This is a substantial appointment not just an honoree
appointment. He has been an advocate before many interna-
tional forums. I think that he has participated in over 20 differ-
ent legal proceedings in the International Court of Justice. It is
probably pretty close to a record. In addition, he has appeared
before the European Commission of Human Rights on numer-
ous occasions. I am informed, just recently, also in the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights and the Commission of The
European Union. He has performed legal services for more
than 33 states during his career. It is really a remarkable
achievement as a lawyer to represent one state in a lifelong ca-
reer, Professor Brownlie's only clients are states which is in it-
self admirable.
As a teacher, before his appointment at Oxford as Chichele
Professor in 1980, he was Professor of International Law at
London 1976-1980, and before that a lecturer at Nodingham,
Oxford and a reader in the Inn's of Court School of Law. He has
been a visiting Professor in Africa, The University of East Afri-
can Gamen and also in Florence. He has been the Director of
study of the International Law Association 1982-1991. He is a
member of the Institute Group Schwab International and has
been a Raconteur, I think it was for solvent community, and of
course Senior Editor of The British Yearbook of International
Law. I had the honor of submitting the text to him one time
when he was a fellow of the British Academy.
He has received many honors throughout his distinguished
career, Commander of the British Empire, Commander of the
Order of Merit of the Norwegian Crown, the Japan Foundation
of Order and the Scholars Distinction Award from the Univer-
sity of Oxford. He is also a very eminent writer, writing widely
in the field of International Law. I will not enumerate his writ-
ings but I would say that most American students are first in-
troduced to Professor Brownlie through his book "Principles of
Public International Law."
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Now in the fourth edition of this book, he has received the
Certificate of Merit from the American Society of International
Law. As I said, he has wide, wide, experience in the peaceful
settlement of disputes. Not only as an advocate but as an arbi-
trator on the panel of arbitrators and conciliators of the World
Bank and the International Investments of Settlement of Inter-
national Investment Disputes.
Well, I have gone on much too long. I am sure you would
have preferred my ideal introduction but I now have the great
honor of giving to you Professor Ian Brownlie, Chichele Profes-
sor of Publish International Law at Oxford.
PROFESSOR IAN BROwNLIE, CBE,QC,FBA
First of all, I would like to thank Professor Blaine Sloan for
the very generous introduction. I would also like to thank the
Pace University School of Law, the Pace International Law So-
ciety and the editors and members of the Pace International
Law Review, who played a part in organising this lecture. It is
a little like bringing coal to Newcastle to bring an international
lawyer from across the Atlantic to talk about international law
and international organisation because New York and its insti-
tutions have vast resources in those fields. And thus I benefit
from the productions of New York and its institutions and I
come here in the spirit of humility to offer my small amount of
experience in front of you and with the title of 'The Peaceful
Settlement of International Disputes in Practice.' I would like
to say what an honor it is to receive an invitation to give the 9th
Annual Blaine- Sloan Lecture.
What are disputes for present purposes? They are disputes
between the existing states with effective governments in place.
There are other kinds of disputes involving the presentation of
existing states, the disintegration of existing states, and the
splitting up of federations, and the settlements of those dis-
putes may involve International Law but the process is one of
appalling complexity and I do not have the time to go through
the entire zoology, as it were, of disputes.
I shall deal with the typical dispute between states involv-
ing effective governments conducting their affairs in a normal
way. A dispute is defined, in a rather formal way, as 'a disa-
greement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or
1995]
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interests between two legal persons.' In other words, it is more
than a conflict of interest and for most practical purposes, in the
International Law world, there are two classes of dispute.
Either the dispute relates to an alleged breach of one or more
legal duties, in an adversarial process or a dispute as to attribu-
tion of title to territory but possibly to some other resource or
artefact. In the latter case the International Court or Court of
Arbitration is asked for a declaration as to title to territory or as
to the determination of an international boundary.
What is peaceful settlement? Well, International Law has
always offered quite an array of methods of peaceful settlement.
In fact, it long ago preempted what is now called alternative
dispute resolution. That which is now being regarded in Eng-
lish law schools as a trendy new appearance, in fact forms part
of International Law. Until recently, in international affairs it
has been the alternative dispute settlement modes which were
typical. Such methods have been not so much alternative but
rather mainstream. In the result International Law can offer
an orchestra of methods of dispute settlement.
First, and obviously, negotiation. That is the normal mode
and we have to remember that when dealing with the regula-
tion and conservation of resources, fisheries, for example, or the
protection of the environment in the continental dimension,
then the adversarial process is virtually irrelevant. It may be
important in the usual way in that it is helpful to have a dispute
settlement process in the background. But the kind of social
engineering that is required by handling of major problems does
not lie in the powers given to judges and arbitrators. So we have
to recognise the very particular role of dispute settlement. It
has a role but there are many areas in which its role is marginal
and perhaps wholly absent.
Secondly and thirdly, we have conciliation and mediation
which are hybrids where law may play a role, but elements of
politics and of compromise are present. But nonetheless, there
is an element to objectivity. The general idea is that of third
party intrusion and the possibility of some real outcome,
although quite often the report which results from conciliation
or mediation is not binding. So far as conciliation is concerned,
the third party intrusion mostly relates to modalities and there
is no imposition of the substance of dispute resolution.
262 [Vol. 7:257
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss2/1
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
In the case of mediation, the third party is more intrusive.
The case of mediation, the third party is more intrusive. The
intrusion is not just procedural but it goes to substance. Media-
tion can be structured to fit the particular problem with its own
particular history. The literature contains more formal defini-
tions of conciliation and mediation. My own impression is that
each exercise is different and some things are called mediation
which are much like conciliation and vise versa.
Now, a very effective mediation, forming part of recent his-
tory, was the mediation relating to the southern region of Chile
and Argentina. This was handled by Pope John Paul II, by the
Holy See, it lasted five and a half years. The procedure involved
numerous meetings between the separate delegations and Car-
dinal Samore who was delegated by His Holiness to do the
work. The process resulted in a very sophisticated peace treaty
which involved not simply questions of delimination but other
forms of cooperation between the two neighbouring states and
the ending of a dispute which in some form or another had
lasted at least since 1881. This mediation is not well-known.
Mediations are not conducted in front of the press and yet I
think those who know about these things would regard it as a
remarkable exercise in dispute settlement.
I shall move on to the series of devices used by the United
Nations and its organs. The UN usually calls its forms of inter-
vention good offices and mediation. But there is a whole range
of different techniques which have been used which do not re-
ally fall into the orthodox categories. For example, the UN, long
ago, invented proximity talks. It has had to deal, unlike tribu-
nals, with situations in which one aspect of the dispute is the
fact that the two parties do not even accept one another's inter-
national status and therefore there is no ready formula of proce-
dural quality. Consequently, proximity talks are organized
which the delegations do not sit in the same room but in rooms
on the same corridor, and UN officials commute between the
rooms with proposals. Sometimes this is done at some distance.
The UN has employed a whole series of devices, sometimes in-
volving special furniture arrangements, which sounds rather
ludicrous, but in fact is the necessary pre-condition to peaceful
settlement of disputes concerning questions of status.
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Lastly, there is the formal, legalistic, and adversarial mode
of settlement in the form of either arbitration or judicial settle-
ment where there is no political element, or if there is, it is very
much in the background. The decisions in accordance with the
principles of International Law and the decisions are binding.
And so two ends of the spectrum are, negotiations with a rela-
tion to politics and compromise, and at the other end, judicial
settlement and arbitration.
What are the outcomes? They are surprisingly varied and
it is unusual to find attempts to list them. My list is very mod-
est. There are many other versions. First, compromise, in
which the role of law is minimal; the political modes of settle-
ment are most likely to result in compromise rather than a le-
gally regulated decision. Secondly, the case of adjudication by
the International Court and/or Courts of Arbitration in which
there is settlement according to law. Thirdly, the multilateral
settlements in which politics plays a major role. Multilateral
settlements will involve legal or non-legal elements and they
are effectively imposed. The imposition may not involve the
overt use of armed forces but it will involve the imposition of
political will with an implied threat of sanctions if the parties
do not accept the outcome.
An example of such a settlement many years ago, but which
in some sense are still in place, is the Geneva Agreement on
Indo-China, 1954. It does not follow that a settlement is harm-
ful, simply because it is imposed, but there is no doubt that this
particular settlement was imposed on the parties concerned.
Thus political and multilateral settlements may be peaceful
only in a relative sense. And there is an interesting borderland,
which there is insufficient time to explore, where peaceful set-
tlements, as it were, merge into something perhaps rather
different.
Now let us look at the instance of peaceful settlement in the
more legalistic mode, the mode which we study in law school.
The focus then is on the current pattern of the adjudication and
arbitration. Both these procedures, in my view, involve a for-
mal method of settlement leading to a binding decision in courts
of law. It is true that in the 19th century arbitration was, in
some sense, opposed to judicial settlement. Arbitration was
often in accordance with the rules of law and equity and arbi-
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trators would be expressly charged to decide in accordance with
law and equity.
Arbitrators were in some cases heads of state who were ex-
pected to provide a decision and outcome which might be to
some extent related to law but was essentially to be effective.
Since 1899 arbitration has been essentially the same as judicial
settlement. It is the form of the procedure and the fact that
decisions emanate from ad hoc courts of arbitration, which dif-
ferentiates arbitration from judicial settlement. The essence of
the operation of an arbitration is the same as that of the
adjudication.
The actual traffic, as it were, in peaceful settlement, in the
last thirty or forty years, has been quite reasonable. It is a
strange fact that textbooks of International Law by and large do
not indicate the pattern. They do not give a quantitative indica-
tion and therefore I would like to give a general description.
Most arbitrations by definition are conducted by what are
called ad hoc courts of arbitration designed to deal with a par-
ticular dispute or small family of disputes. Arbitration can take
place in two ways. Firstly, there is compulsory arbitration on
the basis of standing treaty clauses. This is sort of a compul-
sory jurisdiction where a standard setting treaty dealing with a
particular subject matter has compromisory clause which al-
lows either party to the treaty to invoke the process of arbitra-
tion. In air transport service agreements, such clauses are to be
found and so the United States and France had an arbitration
on the interpretation and application of an air transport serv-
ices agreement (1963-64).
Another example was the arbitration between Chile and
Argentina relating to the Beagle Channel. This was a full
blown arbitration which lasted for three years. The procedures
were as formal and as complex as those of in front of the Inter-
national Court of Justice and the arbitrators themselves, when
appointed, were members of the Court. However, they were ap-
pointed as individuals and not as judges of the Court. Thus the
Court of Arbitration consisted of five judges of the International
Court of Justice. The composition is interesting in that in a dis-
pute between two Latin American states, the Court of Arbitra-
tion did not include any Latin Americans. All the members of
the Court of Arbitration were extra-regional. They were Fitz-
19951
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maurice of the United Kingdom, Dillard of the United States,
Gros of France, Onyeama of Nigeria and Petren of Sweden.
In the case of the Beagle Channel arbitration, and this is
unusual, it was unsuccessful. It is often suggested that arbitra-
tors divide the subject matter between the parties but this is
not really the case. This sounds plausible but it does not reflect
reality. In relation to some subject matters like islands, the
formula is in any case inappropriate. In the Beagle Channel
case Chile got the islands and Argentina did not get the islands.
After the Award in favor of Chile there was a change of admin-
istration in Argentina, and the new military government repu-
diated the Award. And then there was a 12 month period of
unproductive negotiations. There was then an attempt by Ar-
gentina to occupy the islands.
The United States government acted with great alacrity
and warned the Chilean government that they were about to
receive visitors and luckily it is a long way from Buenos Aires to
the islands near Cape Horn. The US government brought the
Holy See into the diplomatic picture. Cardinal Samore, the rep-
resentative of the Holy See, visited Buenos Aires and Santiago
and the two governments were prevailed upon to agree to the
terms of a mediation by His Holiness Pope John Paul II. After a
process lasting five years, the dispute was successfully resolved.
Apart from treaty clauses, you have arbitration that most
often occurs on the basis of a special agreement where there is
no arbitral clause in the pre-existing treaty. There is a dispute.
The parties want to settle it by arbitration. The two states then
negotiate the special agreement precisely to set up the Court of
Arbitration. So the only instrument behind the arbitration is
the bilateral agreement to arbitrate. The problem with arbitra-
tion of course is that each court of arbitration is created for the
sole purpose of deciding the particular dispute. The court is
custom built and is discarded after its use. In that sense, the
parties have to design each Court of Arbitration, and to agree
on its composition and its procedure. They also have to appoint
and pay a registrar and so forth.
There is quite a long list of modern arbitrations and only
some examples can be given. After a war in 1965, India and
Pakistan agreed to take the Rann of Kutch question to arbitra-
tion. This concerned a very large area of territory. Secondly,
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another Argentine-Chile frontier arbitration took place in 1966
concerning some valleys in the Andes. Thirdly, a major conti-
nental shelf arbitration between the United Kingdom and
France relating to the sea bed of the English Channel and the
Atlantic approaches occurred in 1977 and 1978. In addition, the
Taba case about a small, but very contentious, territorial dis-
pute between Israel and Egypt was decided in 1988 in accord-
ance with Article 7 of the Treaty of Peace of 1979. There are
many other arbitrations which are relatively unknown except to
international lawyers.
Cumulatively, the work of arbitral tribunals compare with
the work done by the International Court of Justice in terms of
the type of dispute and also the scale of the pleadings. The terri-
torial dispute which goes to arbitration will get the same type of
attention as it would have got if it went in front of the Interna-
tional Court. There are, however, problems of enforcement. In
the case of the International Court, because of the connection to
the United Nations and because of the multilaterality of these
institutions, so then enforcement tends to be easier, its less
likely that the parties will be difficult. In the case of arbitra-
tion, if a state party reneges on the award, there is not a lot that
can be done. In fact, parties do not often renege on awards of
courts of arbitration because if two governments decide that
they will arbitrate and agree on the terms of arbitration, then it
is unlikely that they will then attack the institution which they
have just designed for their own purposes.
The second type of adversarial procedure, moving on from
arbitration, is the work of semi-permanent tribunals. There are
a number of those on the peace treaties after the Second World
War but the one which Americans would be interested in, and
which is the most recent example, is the Iran-US Claims Tribu-
nal sitting in the Hague. This constitutes the aftermath of the
hostage crisis of 1979-80. The agreement by which that crisis
was settled was obviously about the safety and return of the
hostages but it was also about $7.8 billion worth of claims. The
tribunal created is a standing court of arbitration. There are in
fact three chambers and its work continues to this day. It is a
complicated body. Apart from the parties and their representa-
tives, the United States Department of State lawyers are to be
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seen sitting there exercising a protective role in relation to US
private claimants appearing in front of the Tribunal.
Lastly, we come to permanent tribunals. There has in ef-
fect, apart from some human rights bodies and the Central
American Courts of Justice, which lasted about 10 years, only
been one permanent international tribunal. That is the tribu-
nal known since 1945 as the International Court of Justice,
which was originally praised in 1921 with the title 'Permanent
Court of International Justice.' The concept of a permanent in-
ternational tribunal is very revolutionary and even to this day
the majority of states will not accept the compulsory jurisdiction
of this court. A number of states use it but not by virtue of the
compulsory jurisdiction. When the Court is examined, it is seen
to be a body of 15 dignified men, and now more recently one
woman with the appointment of a new British judge to replace
Sir Robert Jennings in July, and it is a conservative looking
body. States are suspicious of compulsory jurisdiction of that
kind and so it constitutes one of the most radical aspects of in-
ternational affairs, though not often seen as such.
Since 1945 the Court has been concerned with 72 conten-
tious cases and at least 20 advisory opinions, but it is unrealis-
tic to look at the numbers of cases without actually looking at
the type of cases, which include a range of territorial disputes or
boundary delimitation cases where the threshold of jus-
ticiability is normally very high. Outside federal systems it is
normally the case that the boundaries of public law units within
states are not justiciable. Thus, it is probably the case that the
boundary between Scotland and England is not a justiciable
issue.
It is impressive when states allow matters of territorial sov-
ereignty or boundaries to be justiciable and it is a paradox that
a high proportion of cases going in front of the International
Court of Justice are in fact about territorial sovereignty and
boundaries. The Court has been reasonably active sine 1978.
Since then it has had about 22 contentious cases. From time to
time there are some disasters. In 1966, the court came up with
a very unpopular decision in the South-West Africa cases, where
it found on technical grounds that it could deal with the ques-
tions arising out of South Africa's role as Mandatory. Third
World states, now known in politically correct terms as "devel-
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oping states," were very disillusioned with this outcome and
pronouncements were made that the Court had dug its own
grave.
More recently, especially in North America, after the Nica-
ragua case, there were further pronouncements that the useful
life of the Court had come to an end. One of the chief benefits of
living long is to know that most of these pronouncements are
not true and the Court, after the Nicaragua case, got more busi-
ness than ever before because small states were pleased that
the Court had not done what it did in the Nuclear Test Cases,
that is to say, on technical grounds, to refuse to deal with the
merits of the case, thus raising the suspicion that because in
that case the Respondent State was a permanent member of the
Security Council, the Court managed to find a basis on which it
could avoid dealing with the merits. If the Court had actually
backed off the Nicaragua case, one government, that of the
United States, would have been pleased but many other govern-
ments would have been very unimpressed.
Presently the Court hears an array of cases from all regions
of the world. There is no particular pattern and although the
United States, being disenchanted, left the compulsory jurisdic-
tion as a result of the Nicaragua case, the United States very
shortly afterward took a dispute which it had with Italy to the
Court on the basis of a treaty provision. It is widely believed
that the United States deliberately used the Court on that occa-
sion to demonstrate that it was not totally divorced from the
Court. It is also true to say that cases of reneging on judge-
ments are rare and that the Court tends to hear major rather
than minor disputes.
It recently decided the major territorial dispute between
Libya and Chad. This was on the basis of a special agreement.
In this way states that are not parties to the compulsory juris-
diction may use the Court like a standing court of arbitration.
A state may negotiate a special agreement with its neighbour to
take a particular quarrel to the Court. The International Court
decides the case and that is that. Though committed to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the parties settle that par-
ticular dispute. The Libya-Chad case involved the Aouzou
Strip. This had been the source of a conflict between Libya and
Chad. The case was decided by the Court in favour of Chad and
1995]
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within the last 18 months a specially formed UN agency has
supervised the withdrawal of Libyan forces and administration
from the disputed area. This significant episode in peaceful set-
tlement did not receive much publicity in the media.
I shall now turn to the comparison between the Interna-
tional Court and ad hoc Courts of Arbitration. If a small state
wishes to submit a dispute to third party settlement, arbitra-
tion is not convenient. It will have to start from scratch. An
agreement has to be negotiated which creates the entire future
of arbitration. The arbitrators and the registrar have to be
paid. However, arbitration is politically attractive. It takes
place in private and is thus attractive to governments. But it is
expensive. The International Court on the other hand has user-
friendly habits. It has a standing Registry which offers advice
to states who have not appeared in front of the Court before. In
the result and for all sorts of practical reasons, the Interna-
tional Court is a more attractive forum than arbitration.
Lastly, I shall take a look at some of the problematics of
peaceful settlement of disputes. So far a rather upbeat picture
has been given and positive elements have been emphasised.
There are, of course, some problematics. First, there is a duty
in International Law to settle disputes peacefully, but there is
not a duty to settle disputes. Thus the Argentine claim to the
Falklands (or the Malvinas) is based upon not inconsiderable
legal premises and has stood in diplomatic history for many
years. The United Kingdom is not willing to take the dispute to
a court. And possibly Argentina is also unwilling. And the dis-
pute remains a source of tension from time to time. The ab-
sence of a duty to settle disputes constitutes a gap in the
international system.
Secondly, there is a serious problem when settlement is ef-
fected by political organs. This is because there is a certain ab-
sence of due process. So for example, in the American Society of
International Law in 1981, my colleague Professor Elihu Lau-
terpacht expressed reservations about the way in which the Se-
curity Council takes decisions in matters affecting the legal
interests of states. He used the examples of the decisions taken
in relation to issues concerning the Middle East, issues affecting
what was then Rhodesia, and certain other cases. And there
are perhaps some problems as to whether there are inherent
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limitations of the type of decision which a political organ should
take. For example, the Security Council has in the recent past
decided to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait.
It did this on a perfectly reasonable basis that having ejected
Iraq's forces by way of collective self-defence from Kuwaiti terri-
tory, the source of danger to regional peace should be removed.
And one aspect of the exercise was the fixing of the boundary
which was one of the alleged reasons for Iraq's action. Now,
there is a question, which I shall not treat dogmatically,
whether in fact the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq has ac-
tually been settled yet.
In International Law terms the issue outstanding may
have been a delimitation rather than a matter of demarcation.
Demarcation relates to a boundary which in principle has been
established. The Security Council considered that it was de-
marcating an existing delimitation established in 1963. Some
international lawyers have questioned whether the delimitation
of 1963 was a definitive delimitation. Secondly, there was also
the establishment by the Security Council of a maritime delimi-
tation, which had not existed previously. It is a nice question
whether a political organ has the power to settle the boundaries
of states. The source of doubt consists in the fact that if a
boundary is created in the conditions in which the Security
Council proposed to do it, in other words, in accordance with
International Law, then at least some international lawyers
have always assumed that it could only be done either with the
consent of the parties or on the basis of a judicial settlement,
that is, in accordance with due process of law.
There are other problematics. The invasion of Kuwait in-
volved a dispute which was in fact a situation involving various
factors of interest as between Iraq and Kuwait. The issues be-
tween Nicaragua and the United States in the 1980's included
legal issues. But the context extended to clashes of geopolitical
interest in the region, involving non-regional powers. And so
when you have matters which cannot be classified as legal is-
sues, which constitute conflicts of interest, then the lawyers
have to withdraw because the vehicles we design are not really
suited to resolving such conflicts. This is not necessarily a criti-
cism of lawyers and the whole area of political disputes is not
really susceptible to legal action in the ordinary form.
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BRIEF QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH THE AUDIENCE
PROFESSOR SINHA: Professor Brownlie has very kindly
agreed to hear respective views, and those questions and com-
ments and I will be here assisting in recognizing who you are.
DR. EMMANUEL J. LOBATO: Professor Brownlie, has the
world reached a situation where we have to redefine sover-
eignty? If you take a look at what has happened in Venezuela
and Ecuador and where you can settle peacefully between Can-
ada and Spain on the fishing dispute. But why did the US need
force to buy into China to sell many aspects of it when the rest
of the world takes our world market seriously? Have we
reached a point where we ought to redefine sovereignty and
force upon nations, peace, without perhaps building an interna-
tional military force for the UN? But I think we have to do
something or face disaster. Have we reached that point?
PROFESSOR IAN BROWNLIE: Well, the difficulty is, I have a
debate with myself practically everyday on this kind of issue. If
we are dealing with a threat to the environment, sometimes
with irreversible results or if we are dealing with a problem of
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, then we natu-
rally incline towards limiting sovereignty and having controls
which are effective even if those controls involve an erosion of
sovereignty.
But then there is the other side. If we are talking about
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and it is effective
or is it fair to say within a given region, some states must un-
dergo that sort of control while others are not subjected to any
kind of control. Probably equality which is an aspect of the
existence of states. The other side of the same problem, in the
international order, is that no one has yet designed an alterna-
tive to the state. If we go behind the state, we say boundaries
don't matter, and of course, powerful states tend to say bounda-
ries do not matter, not weak states, what will happen is you will
have even more difficulties. And in former Yugoslavia, and pos-
sibly in areas of the former Soviet Union, where the state sys-
tem dissolves, it ceases to work effectively, you have even more
breaches of human rights. Refugee flows, maltreatment of mi-
norities and general instability. So, I hear what you say, I hear
with sympathy but I also know there are, as it were, counter
currents or currents the other way, which recognize that the
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state and its boundaries is a public order system. It may be
flawed but it is there. And when it disappears, as it threatens
to do in parts of Eastern Europe, the results are very
unattractive.
DR. BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ: Professor Brownlie, you have
suggested incorrectly that questions have been raised about the
validity of Security Council decisions acting under Chapter 7
which seem to international lawyers to go beyond what might
have been cited had there been a judicial interpretation. The
presence of that kind of doubt about the Security Council under-
mines the Security Council to a certain degree. Would it help
the situation if the rules of the Security Council were amended,
they are still operating under draft rules going back to 1946. I
believe, in which the Security Council themselves said, in cases
where there is a legal element involved, we will seek an advi-
sory opinion from the International Court of Justice before we
decide upon the enforcement which is necessary.
PROFESSOR IAN BROWNLIE: Well, I think that might, so to
speak, improve the atmosphere. But the second time, I appreci-
ate that if you are dealing with governments for some purposes,
and the Security Council is a government, then a high time of
judicial review will, as it were, power plays of government. The
problem is how we can balance between maintaining the rule of
law and controlling discretionary powers to some extent. And
at the same time, allowing governments to be effective. The dif-
ficulty with the Security Council is it has been very, very, reluc-
tant to ask for advisory opinions. But on the sort of question
that has arisen in the recent past, I think it is more the atti-
tudes towards decision making of individual members of the Se-
curity Council which creates problems.
Now, there is no judicial review in international system. In
the sense that no individual member state of UN has a right to
go to the court to challenge a decision of the organ and it is true
that the International Court is seized of issues. In other words,
one of the political organs actually asks for advisory opinion.
The price of asking for advisory opinion is that the court is go-
ing to act judicially does not have to weigh the legal validity of
decisions of the political organs. So you get an incidental mat-
ter of judicial review as a result of the operation of the advisory
opinion jurisdiction by the court. But that is incidental, it does
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not happen very often. I am more concerned at the moment at
the extent of the Security Council is being used essentially as a
vehicle for the current policy of a very small group of states,
essentially three. It does not mean that group of states is get-
ting in trouble all the time. But nonetheless, a group in all
terms, it is a worry situation.
The International Law for the most part is law of its self-
limitation, as it is public law within the state. But my lines is
always to defend International Law, pointing out the public law
within the state where you have rules addressed to government
which are also made by government. Then it is the policy of the
individual actors in the Security Council, which I think is, at
the end of the day, what is important. I sympathize with your
idea. The rules could be changed that the councils could be
made institutionally more responsive to law in that sense. I
think probably that is unrealistic and it is the attitude towards
International Law of the individual members of the Security
Council which is perhaps the problem.
DR. Roy S. LEE: Thank you. There are two questions. The
first one relates to your second part of your lecture regarding
the problematic settlement of dispute. Your second point, while
there is a duty to settle disputes peacefully but it is no duty to
settle disputes. I think that is the problem that is the most fun-
damental point. That in the international system, I meant a
state is willing and consents to settle a dispute, nobody can
compel you to settle a dispute. Given that being the basis, I
wonder if you see any possibility at all that this basis may be
modified. On the assumption that such basis cannot be changed
and will continue. What alternative do we have?
For example, since we cannot compel states to settle their
disputes, which are only entitled to settle dispute. We have to
promote development, we have the USDT for help, we have the
WHO for children, welfare, we have UNICEF. But we do not
have a broker to promote dispute resolution. I was told perhaps
this is an area that we should think about. Looking at the re-
cent development, one realizes that the Court of Arbitration is
trying to stick to spearheading this area creating a trust fund
and also trying to improve its procedure. How do you see the
possibility of this development?
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My second point is that I would like to ask your view re-
garding the question of multiplicity of the International Courts
and Tribunal. That word was used by a former president of the
International Court of Justice. The Spanish interpreter after-
wards told me that he thought he heard the word duplicity.
Any possibility of making these tribunals and courts more com-
patible and complimentary in their function? I think the ICJ
and the coming tribunal, the International Law of the sea tribu-
nal. Thank you.
PROFESSOR IAN BROWNLIE: Well, I do not have any, these
phases or proposals, I do not think there are any easy solutions.
I think that it would be a good thing, especially international
relations people as well as lawyers did study disputes more
often. I do not think just legal settlement of dispute, but the
nature of dispute. There are those of us involved in disputes.
There is a certain topology of disputes. For example, disputes
involving air services agreements and are solved within the na-
tion any international civil air transport which is a very import
aspect of International Law which we all benefit from each time
we move across boundaries, is a very good example of a law reg-
ulated area. When you have a dispute settlement which is not
sort of imposed upon the customers. The legal theory in the law
schools, especially in England, I would say, but possibly also in
the US, tends to talk about laws that have to be imposed on
people. You have Admiralty law for shipping, international
civil air transport and so forth, where the law is part of the mi-
lieu. It is part of the operation. And some of the lower adminis-
trators are not even aware they are applying International Law,
and, of course, they are. So, the certain types of dispute within
the kind of milieu gets settled because nobody has an alterna-
tive, you want to run your airlines in certain countries, you
have to play by the multilateral rules, otherwise you cannot
play ball at all.
Territorial disputes are rather different. And international
disputes are not like municipal law disputes. For example, mu-
nicipal law most often somebody sues you, he is not your neigh-
bor. The great thing about the international system and the
appalling thing about it is that you cannot choose your neigh-
bor. You can't shift neighbors. You have the neighbors you
have and it gives a different dimension to boundary disputes. It
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is not just you have a boundary dispute with another state but
it is your neighbor and your whole relations are at issue to some
extent, at least in a political sense. So, international disputes
vary in type, the treatment varies. So, in international air
transport, for example, but there are other examples, in a sense
you cannot play at all, you cannot go out and trade, you cannot
travel unless you accept the entire dispute settlement appara-
tus in the regions, the whole settlement.
Boundary disputes, strange as it may seem, not out of paci-
fism but simply because fighting wars to settle dispute is ap-
pallingly inconvenient. There are all sorts of states, great
variety of types of states, different religions, different political
backgrounds, some autocratic, some democratic, use the Inter-
national Court or use arbitration to settle major disputes
among their territory. Why do they do that? I think this has to
be looked at and then answer to Professor Lee is, well you find
what induces states to do this instead of that. To use bureau-
cratic peaceful legal matters rather than use the threat of force.
In the case of oil sea bed disputes, about oil, it is well
known that if the dispute settlement mechanism is not used,
none of the companies will drill. Because you have to have legal
stability, you have to know who your landlord is going to be. So,
what I am saying is, there is a whole series of setups, milieus in
which you can study what motivates states to use peaceful set-
tlements, legalistic matters as opposed to some other manner.
In respect to the multiplicity problem, then my own view is
it does no harm. I do not see that it would be particularly valu-
able, it might be, so to speak, effectively more attractive if there
was some higher of international tribunals. In fact, I think the
multiplicity of tribunals reflects the multiplicity of relations be-
tween states, the complexities of regional customs and ways of
doing things. It gives a wide range of preferences. So you may
have a state that is quite happy to use one mechanism but not
another, there is choice. There is competition between the in-
ternational courts and ad hoc courts of arbitration, not an an-
tagonistic competition but a simple competition. If everybody
used arbitration the people in Hague would get less business
and they would not be too happy about that. But it is not an
antagonistic competition, it is a set of options of procedural op-
tions and I see no great harm in it. The way you do have insti-
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tutional incoherence or at least complications in relations as
between the European Information of Human Rights and the
Court of Human Rights, then the experience is used over a pe-
riod to evolve reform. In the case of the European established
institutions the relations between the two institutions are now
being rationalized. The setup is being tidied up. So, there are
problems that can be removed. Generally, multiplicity is fine, it
is the biggest set of options, it reflects the complexities of the
world.
MR. STAN KuRTzBAN: In the last ten thousand years, we
have developed legal systems as opposed to subjects have been
individuals and after two or three thousand years, we've
evolved to the point where people are peacefully resolving their
disputes more often then not. There debits are less common.
Now, nations have been the subject of such laws and such tribu-
nals for less than a century. Do we have to wait another three
thousand years before we repeat that good lesson, before we
learn to trust tribunals for fair disputes and before we develop
the mechanisms for effective enforcement of those fair decisions
that are rendered? I think, particularly, about the commitment
of nations to forces to the United Nations for enforcement of res-
olutions of disputes.
PROFESSOR IAN BROWNLIE: Well, I think the ultimate prob-
lem is the nature of governments and the quality of govern-
ments and decision making within the states. When it comes to
peaceful settlement of disputes, the fact is the vehicles are
there, they are not lacking, it is simply a question of political
will and even habit patterns. For example, it is a strange fact
that the International Court is very busy. It gets important
cases from a great variety of states and the only explanation for
that, and academics always like explanation. You have to have
an explanation, or at least you have to have an intellectual in-
teresting explanation.
My explanation is banal, not intellectually interesting,
which is simply as more and more states use that method to get
results further customers go to the same door. So the Interna-
tional Court actually produces competence and objective deci-
sions. Everybody thinks so. Those that use it are quite happy
with the results. It is a question of governments deciding, hav-
ing the political will, and it tells us it is not as simple as that
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because if you take the dispute to an international tribunal on
the basis that if you lose, you will still accept the result. You
may be in serious trouble with your own political constituents.
In a case like the Gulf of Mexico, the case between the United
States and Canada and Gulf of Maine. Then there were impor-
tant political constituencies. There were federal state relations
involved and each government was taking quite a considerable
political risk. In losing control of disputes you lose control over
an adversary, part of your policy if you take a case to an inter-
national tribunal. And so it is not if the governments are being
particularly responsible at the end of the day, it is how govern-
ments behave. Vehicles are there, traffic is taking place and
there is no reason why the traffic should not increase.
MR. MAIM CONSTANTINE: Along the lines of the political
risk a leader of nations takes in conforming with this peaceful
dispute process you mentioned, for example, it's 5 years. I think
for the resolution between Chile and Argentina, isn't'it also a
political risk for a leader to make himself a party to process
which takes this long amount of time? In the United States in a
matter of four years, this president may not be around to see
the results, he might not be here, and in this day and age it's
like Operation Desert Storm where things can get done rather
quickly. What are the prospects for this process to be stream-
lined somewhat and will it always take 5 years?
PROFESSOR IAN BROWNLIE: It has to be said that there are
disputes of a small territory involving failure to identify where
a boundary leads to walls placed some years back. There are
many disputes which are literally faced on the telephone be-
tween the two ministers on either side of the boundary or even
between quite local or regional administrators. States with
good relations, working relations, frequently settle disputes, or
at least avoid the development of a dispute, very rapidly. All
too often when you have a dispute that is difficult to settle, it is
because those two states have bad relations anyway and they
cannot tame the boundary quarrel when it starts or breaks out
again. In the case of Ecuador and Peru, while that dispute is by
no means a new one, but I think federal states have a lot to offer
in terms of setting a political example, because in the United
States, boundary disputes between states are justiciable in the
Supreme Court. By and large when you do not have control
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over disputes between states now they use their worst option
and use the rather technical boundaries involving river bound-
ary disputes between Tennessee and one of its neighbors
through a series of such disputes.There are boundary disputes between federal system and
the individual states over maritime delimitation and Professor
Westerman who is somewhere in the room, who is an expert on
that problem. So federal states model really on having compul-
sory jurisdiction precisely for the settlement of disputes about
the boundaries of public law units, the states. Thank you.
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